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Abstract
For games of contracting under perturbed best response dynamics, varying the perturbations
along two dimensions (uniform vs. logit, directed vs. undirected) gives four possibilities.
Three of these select differing major bargaining solutions as stochastically stable. The fourth
possibility yields a new bargaining solution which exhibits significant nonmonotonicities and
demonstrates the interplay of two key drivers of evolutionary selection: (i) the ease of making
errors; (ii) the ease of responding to errors.
Keywords: Evolution, adaptive learning, bargaining.
JEL Classification Numbers: C73, C78.
1. Introduction
For games of contracting characterized by a convex bargaining set, we show that under
perturbed best response dynamics, by varying the perturbations along two simple dimensions
(uniform vs. logit, directed vs. undirected), any of the major bargaining solutions can emerge
as a stochastically stable convention. There are two populations, each corresponding to a
position in a contract game: a coordination game with zero payoffs for miscoordination. Most
of the time, agents play best responses to the distribution of play of the other population.
However, from time to time an agent will make an error and play something other than
a best response. Error probabilities can be uniform – all errors are equally likely, or logit
– errors which incur a higher payoff loss for the agent making them are less likely to be
made. Young (1998a) showed that the best response dynamic with uniform errors leads to
the selection of the Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) bargaining solution. Naidu, Hwang and
Bowles (2010) showed that if the support of the perturbation distribution is restricted to be
directed so that agents’ errors only involve demanding more, never less, then the Nash (1950)
bargaining solution is selected. The current paper extends the analysis of such models to
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Undirected Directed
Uniform Kalai-Smorodinsky Nash bargaining
Logit Q4 Egalitarian
Table 1: Stochastically stable bargaining solutions by error process.
payoff-dependent errors. In doing so, it makes three distinct contributions to the literature:
a methodological contribution, an applied contribution, and an analytical contribution.
To combine state-dependent error probabilities with population dynamics, the paper
makes a methodological contribution. In contrast to the case of uniform errors, the most
probable transitions between conventions of contract games under the logit choice rule can
involve errors being made by both populations. It is shown that for contract games played
under a popular class of strategy revision rules, for large population size, the cost of such
transitions can be well approximated by the cost of the most probable transition which
involves errors by only a single population (Theorem 1). A sufficient condition on strategy
revision rules for such an approximation is that error probabilities depend log-linearly on
payoffs. This condition is satisfied by the class of exponential revision rules, a popular and
flexible class of rules which includes the logit choice rule and exponential better reply rules.
Using these results, the paper makes an applied contribution to the literature on the
evolution of bargaining solutions. It is shown that if the logit choice rule is used with directed
errors, then the Egalitarian bargaining solution (Kalai, 1977) is selected. Moreover, the logit
choice rule with undirected errors selects a new solution, which we call the Q4 solution as it
corresponds to the remaining quadrant in table 1. Although it is developed from the same
set of ingredients as the existing solutions, the Q4 solution exhibits significantly different
properties. For example, holding the bargaining frontier close to the solution fixed, the Q4
solution is non-monotonic with respect to maximum obtainable payoffs: an increase in a
player’s maximum payoff can lead to a decrease in the amount he receives. Moreover, the
solution can be non-monotonic with respect to stretches of the bargaining set parallel to
the axes. Even Nash’s bargaining solution, which is well known to breach the (individual)
monotonicity axiom of Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975), is monotonic with respect to such
stretches.
The paper makes an analytical contribution by highlighting the importance of interaction
between two drivers of selection in evolutionary models: (i) the ease of making errors; (ii)
the ease of responding to errors. Factor (i) enters directly through the error distribution.
Factor (ii) enters because multiple errors in a population can be required to shift the process
away from a convention, with the precise number of errors required depending on both
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the current convention and on which errors occur. Under uniform errors, any mistake is
equally likely in any state, so factor (i) plays no role in selection. As noted above, for large
and equal population sizes, the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution is selected in such a
setting. Logit errors are payoff dependent and so introduce factor (i). If both populations
are of size 1, then factor (ii) plays no role in selection, and logit errors select the Egalitarian
bargaining solution. Combining the two effects via logit errors and large populations, we
obtain the unexpected result that the new solution does not necessarily lie between the Kalai-
Smorodinsky and Egalitarian solutions: the player who receives the greater share under the
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution can be the player who receives the lesser share under the Q4
solution.
That effects (i) and (ii) can work in opposite directions is by no means obvious from the
existing literature. Consider the parallel literature on stochastic stability in Nash demand
games. Young (1993b) shows that in two player Nash demand games, the Nash bargaining
solution is stochastically stable. Agastya (1999) shows that if a cooperative game is modelled
as a generalized Nash demand game, then the stochastically stable states are states in the
core at which the maximum payoff over all players is minimized. Newton (2012b) shows
that, under some conditions, the addition of joint strategic switching to such models leads to
Rawlsian selection within the (interior/strong) core, maximizing the minimum payoff over
all players. For the assignment game (Shapley and Shubik, 1971), a cooperative game for
which the core has an empty interior so the methods of Newton (2012b) cannot be applied,
Nax and Pradelski (2013) have recently shown a maxmin selection result within the core.
Interestingly, although both papers attain similar results, these results arise in different
ways. Nax and Pradelski (2013) use logit errors: error probabilities depends log-linearly on
payoff differences. Selection then comes from (i) how hard it is for a player to make errors.
Newton (2012b) uses uniform errors and sampling of opponents’ behavior: selection comes
from (ii) how hard it is for a player to respond to errors. In the papers cited above, these
effects turn out to work towards a similar result. The current paper demonstrates that this
is not always the case and that the combination of effects (i) and (ii) can create interesting
nonmonotonicities.
This paper adds to the literature on perturbed adaptive dynamics, specifically on best
response dynamics under various perturbations. The methodology, that of Freidlin and
Wentzell (1984), was introduced to economics by Young (1993a) and Kandori, Mailath and
Rob (1993). For any given stable state of an unperturbed dynamic, it is clear that there
exists some perturbed dynamic such that the stationary distribution of the process gives a
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probability close to one of the process being in that state.1 See Bergin and Lipman (1996);
van Damme and Weibull (2002) for more discussion of this kind of result. The point of the
current paper is that the most commonly used error processes (uniform and logit), with and
without an intuitive restriction on the domain of the errors, suffice to select all three major
bargaining solutions: they are all part of the same evolutionary family. In addition, the family
has a fourth member which is in some ways alike, but in other ways totally unlike the existing
solutions. As well as previous results on processes within this family (Young, 1998a; Naidu
et al., 2010) which are included in the classification of the current paper, a related result in
Newton (2012a) incorporates coalitional behavior into perturbation structures, showing that
if random errors are uniform, but coalitional behavior occurs with higher probability than
random errors, then the Nash bargaining solution is selected.
Our results show that similar evolutionary processes to those used to justify common
bargaining solutions found in the literature can justify other bargaining norms with unex-
pected and interesting attributes. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the ideas of the paper with a simple example. Section 3 gives the evolutionary model and
defines the bargaining solutions. Section 4 gives the approximation result which is the main
methodological contribution of the paper. Section 5 uses this result to classify bargaining
solutions by the evolutionary perturbations which give rise to them. Section 6 examines the
properties of the new bargaining solution. Section 7 concludes.
2. Leading example
Consider the normal form game in figure 1. Note that there are three strict Nash equilib-
ria: (Aα, Aβ), (Bα, Bβ), (Cα, Cβ). We shall consider the evolution of play in three differing
dynamic situations.
Aβ Bβ Cβ Dβ
Aα 7,5 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
Bα 0, 0 6,6 0, 0 0, 0
Cα 0, 0 0, 0 5,7 0, 0
Dα 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0,10
Figure 1: A two player normal form game.
1For example, define a perturbation structure such that there is probability ε of transiting from any state
to a given stable state i of the unperturbed dynamic, and let the probability of leaving i be ε2. Then, for
small ε, close to all the probability mass of the stationary distribution will be on state i.
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2.1. Two players, logit errors.
Consider two players, α and β, who correspond to the positions in the game in figure
1. Each period, one of the players is chosen at random to adjust his strategy. Most of the
time, a player so chosen plays a best response to the current action of the opposing player,
with each possible best response being chosen with equal probability if there is more than
one best response. However, with small probability, the chosen player will make an error
and switch to an action which is not a best response. Each possible error occurs with a
probability of order εl, where ε is some small number and l is the difference between the
payoff from playing a best response and the payoff from making the error. For example, if
the current actions of the players are (Aα, Aβ) and player β is chosen to update his action,
then he will play action Bβ with a probability of order ε
5−0 = ε5. Following this error, if
player α is chosen to update his action, he can best respond with Bα, and the pure Nash
profile (Bα, Bβ) is reached. In a similar manner, (Bα, Bβ) can be reached from (Cα, Cβ).
However, to leave (Bα, Bβ), an error of probability of order ε
6 is required. This implies that
for small ε, almost all of the weight of the stationary distribution of this Markov chain will
be on the state in which (Bα, Bβ) is played. The limiting stationary distribution as ε → 0
places all weight on this state: it is uniquely stochastically stable. Note that a single error is
all that is required to induce a different best response from the opposing player: selection is
entirely driven by how easy it is to make errors. This creates a bias towards egalitarianism.
2.2. Two populations of ten agents each, uniform errors.
Now assume that rather than a single player for each position of the game, there exist
two populations, each of which comprises 10 agents. One of the populations is associated
with position α in the game, the other population with position β. Each period, a single
agent from one of the populations is chosen at random to adjust his strategy. Most of the
time, an agent so chosen plays a best response to the distribution of current actions of the
opposing population. With small probability, the chosen agent will make an error and switch
to an action which is not a best response. Each possible error occurs with a probability of
order ε. That is, each possible error occurs with similar probability, independent of the
payoff loss incurred by making the error. Note that in the population setting, starting from
a state in which every agent plays actions corresponding to some Nash equilibrium of the
game, multiple errors by agents in one population can be necessary to induce an agent in
the opposing population to play a best response that differs from the action corresponding
to the original Nash equilibrium. For example, starting from a state in which every agent
plays action A, at least 4 errors by α-agents where they switch to Dα are required to induce
a β-agent to best respond with Dβ. If every β-agent switches to Dβ, then when an α-agent
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is chosen to update his strategy, any action will be a best response. If the α-agents switch
to action Cα, then β-agents can best respond with Cβ, and the state in which every agent
plays C will be reached. A similar transition is possible from the state in which every agent
plays B to the state in which every agent plays C. However, from the state in which every
agent plays C, at least 5 errors will be necessary to induce a best response other than to
play C. Therefore, for small ε, almost all of the weight of the stationary distribution of
this Markov chain will be on the state in which every agent plays C. This state is uniquely
stochastically stable. Note that in this process every error occurs with similar probability:
selection is entirely driven by how easy it is to respond to errors. This creates a bias favouring
populations who have some possibility of high payoffs, such as the possibility of a payoff of
10 for β-agents in the game in figure 1.
2.3. Two populations of ten agents each, logit errors.
Now consider the process with two populations of 10 agents each, and with perturbations
occuring with probabilities of order εl as described above. It can be checked that the easiest
way to transition from every agent playing A to any state corresponding to one of the
other pure Nash equilibria is as follows. First, 3 of the α-agents make errors and play
Dα. These errors occur with probability of order ε
7 each. The payoff loss for a β-agent of
playing Dβ rather than Aβ is then 5 · 7/10 − 10 · 3/10 = 1/2. Next, let all 10 of the β-agents
make errors and play Dβ. These errors occur with probability of order ε
1/2 each. Following
this, when an α-agent is chosen to update his strategy, any action will be a best response.
Therefore the overall transition probability is of order (ε7)3 · (ε1/2)10 = ε26. Note that these
lowest cost transitions involve errors by agents in both populations. One contribution of the
current paper is to show that for large populations, the calculation of transition costs can be
simplified by restricting attention to paths in which errors only occur in a single population.
From the state in which every agent plays B (C), there exists a transition to the state
in which every agent plays A in which 4 (5) α-agents make errors and play Dα, giving a
transition probability of order ε24 (ε25). Therefore, for small ε, almost all of the weight of
the stationary distribution of this Markov chain will be on the state in which every agent
plays A. This state is uniquely stochastically stable. Selection in this process is driven by
both how easy it is to make errors and by how easy it is to respond to errors. By combining
these two effects, the outcome is better for α-agents than that selected by either of these
effects acting on their own. The remainder of the paper will examine the interplay of these
two effects in settings where the range of possible coordination outcomes is given by a convex
bargaining set.
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3. Evolution and bargaining
3.1. Bargaining Problem
Consider two positions, α and β. Players in these positions bargain over which pair of
payoffs is selected from a bargaining set. Let S ⊂ R2 be the bargaining set which is convex
and compact and a ∈ R2 be the disagreement point: the payoffs that players receive when
agreement is not reached. We suppose that a is normalized to (0, 0) which belongs to the
bargaining set. We assume that for each S there exists a decreasing, differentiable, and
concave function, fS, such that (t, fS(t)) is the efficient allocation in which α and β players
receive t and fS(t), respectively. Thus, the maximum payoff that players α and β can obtain
from bargaining are
s¯α := sup {t : fS(t) ≥ 0} and s¯β := sup {fS(t) : t ≥ 0} ,
respectively. We shall also routinely omit the subscript from fS(.), writing f(.).
A bargaining solution maps bargaining problems to allocations. A bargaining solution
is essentially a rule by which surplus in a bargaining problem is allocated. The three bar-
gaining solutions most commonly used in economics are the Nash bargaining solution (Nash,
1950), the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975), and the
Egalitarian bargaining solution (Kalai, 1977).
Definition 1. Let S be a bargaining set with a bargaining frontier given by fS(.). Denote
by ( t·, fS(t·) ) the solution associated to the bargaining solution under consideration.
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution t
KS
s¯α
= fS(t
KS)
s¯β
.
Nash bargaining solution tNB ∈ arg max0≤t≤s¯α tfS(t).
Egalitarian solution tE = fS(t
E).
These solutions each uniquely satisfy distinct sets of intuitively appealing axioms. Such
axioms are further discussed in section 6. Furthermore, it has been shown that the Kalai-
Smorodinsky and Nash solutions can emerge from plausible models of adaptive behavior
(Young, 1998a; Binmore, Samuelson and Young, 2003; Naidu et al., 2010; Newton, 2012a).
One contribution of the current paper is to show that the same is true for the Egalitarian
solution.
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3.2. Evolutionary contracting
Consider two populations of agents − α and β populations − of size N .2 Two agents,
one from each population, are matched to play a coordination game. The set of possible
outcomes on which coordination is possible corresponds to a bargaining set as described in
section 3.1. Similarly to previous literature on evolution and bargaining, we discretize the
bargaining set as follows. Let n ∈ Z+, δ = δn = n−1s¯α, and I := {0, 1, 2, · · · , n} and suppose
that the two agents each play a strategy from the following sets, respectively:
player α : {0, 1δ, · · · , nδ} , player β : {f(0), f(δ), f(2δ), · · · , f(nδ)}.
To simplify notation, we will denote by iα and iβ strategies iδ and f(iδ), respectively.
A strategy profile or a state of two populations is described by x := (xα, xβ), where xα
and xβ are vectors giving the number of agents using each strategy. Thus, the state space Ξ
is
Ξ :=
{
(xα, xβ) :
∑
l∈I
xα(l) = N, xα(l) ∈ N0,
∑
l∈I
xβ(l) = N , xβ(l) ∈ N0
}
More explicitly, we have (xα, xβ) = ((xα(0), xα(1), · · · , xα(n)), (xβ(0), xβ(1), · · · , xβ(n))),
where xβ(2), for example, denotes the number of β-agents playing strategy 2β = f(2δ).
We consider contract games (Young, 1998a), coordination games in which players who
demand the same outcome receive their associated payoffs, and receive nothing otherwise.
That is, the payoffs for a contract game are
(piα(iα, jβ), piβ(jβ, iα)) =
{
(iδ, f(iδ)) if i = j
0 otherwise
.
Our description of the strategy space precludes inefficient contractual agreements, an omis-
sion which simplifies exposition without affecting the results of the paper. To avoid notational
clutter, we shall occasionally denote piα(i) := piα(iα, iβ) and piβ(i) := piβ(iβ, iα). Agents from
each population are matched to play the contract game and thus, the expected payoff of an α
agent who plays strategy iα is piα(iα, xβ) :=
∑
l∈I piα(iα, l)xβ(l)/N , given that the fraction
of the β population using strategy l is xβ(l)/N. Similarly, the expected payoff of a β-agent
who plays strategy iβ is piβ(iβ, xα) :=
∑
l∈I piβ(iβ, l)xα(l)/N.
2Exposition is simplified by the assumption that the populations are of the same size. This is always the
case when the two populations represent roles played by different agents in the same population. That is,
each agent could be considered to appear twice: he will play one strategy when he plays as an α-player, and
another strategy when he plays as a β-player.
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We consider a discrete time strategy updating process defined as follows. At each period,
an agent from either the α population or the β population is randomly chosen and matched
to play the contract game with an agent from the other population. The chosen agent selects
a strategy (which will be used to play the game) based on his evaluation of the expected
payoffs of the different strategies. The agents idiosyncratically experiment with non-optimal
strategies, or simply make mistakes. The probability of such mistakes will be parameterized
by a parameter η, and larger values of η will correspond to higher mistake probabilities.
To study various behavioral rules of strategy revising agents, we suppose that the tran-
sition probabilities for the strategy updating process, P η, admit a real-valued function
V (x, y) satisfying
lim
η→0
−η lnP η(x, y) = V (x, y) (1)
where V is defined over the set of all x, y ∈ Ξ such that P ηˆ(x, y) > 0 for some ηˆ > 0 (see
Beggs, 2005; Sandholm, 2010b). Here, P η(x, y) is the transition probability from state x to
state y. The resistance of a transition from x to y, V (x, y), measures the rarity of transitions
from x to y. To determine the function V for a given P η, we sometimes use the following
fact, whose substantial generalization is known as Varadhan’s Lemma in the literature on
large deviations (e.g. see Dembo and Zeitouni, 1998).
Lemma 1. Suppose that f and g are functions on Ξ and g is positive. Then we have∑
x∈Ξ
exp(η−1f(x))g(x)  exp(η−1 max
x∈Ξ
f(x))
where aη  bη means limη→0 η(log aη − log bη) = 0.
To specify transition probabilities more precisely, we first write as xγ,l,l
′
the state induced
from x by a γ population (γ = α or β) agent’s strategy change from l to l′. That is, for
γ = α, β, we have:
xγ,l,l
′
γ (i) :=

xγ(i) if i 6= l, l′
xγ(i)− 1 if i = l
xγ(i) + 1 if i = l
′
In the context of population dynamics, the typical form of the transition probability P η(x, y)
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is as follows:
P η(x, y) =

xγ(l)
2N
pηγ(l
′|l, x) if y = xγ,l,l′ for some γ, l, l′
1−∑γ,l,l′ xγ(l)2N pηγ(l′|l, x) if y = x
0 otherwise
, (2)
where
∑
l′ p
η
γ(l
′|l, x) ≤ 1. In equation (2), the factor xγ(l)/2N in the first line accounts for the
probability of randomly choosing a γ- agent with strategy l. The term pηγ(l
′|l, x) gives the
conditional probability that a chosen agent from population γ will switch from strategy l
to strategy l′ given that the state of the populations is x. We will specify this probability
shortly. The second line in the transition probability normalizes and the last line means
that the only transitions which are possible from x are to states xγ,l,l
′
. Specification (2)
defines a family of Markov chains parametized by η. This paper considers processes with
perturbations varying in two dimensions: the perturbations can be uniform or logit, and
they can be directed or undirected. The definitions of these concepts shall now be given.
3.3. (Generalized) Logit choice rule
Under the generalized logit choice rule, from state x, a strategy-revising agent who is
currently playing l, will switch to l′ with a probability given by
pηγ(l
′|l, x) := ql exp(η
−1piγ(l′, x))∑
l˜ ql˜ exp(η
−1piγ(l˜, x))
(3)
where ql, l ∈ I, are positive constants. When ql = 1 for all l ∈ I, equation (3) gives the logit
choice rule which is well-known in the literature of evolutionary games (see Blume, 1993,
1996).3 The parameter η measures the degree of perturbation in best response rules and
can be interpreted as noise in observing others’ strategies and evaluating expected payoffs,
the frequency of mistakes or experimentation in strategy revision, and so on. As η → 0,
the probability of a strategy-revising agent playing anything other than a best response
approaches zero. From Lemma 1, it follows that the resistance V (x, xγ,l,l
′
) of a transition
from x to xγ,l,l
′
equals
lim
η→0
−η lnP η(x, xγ,l,l′) = max
l˜
piγ(l˜, x)− piγ(l′, x).
The interpretation of this is that the probabilities of errors which cause higher payoff losses
approach zero faster as η → 0. Error probabilities are asymptotically log-linear in payoff
3Alternatively, it could be the case that ql˜ = 1 for some l˜ and ql˜ ≈ 0 otherwise. Such a behavioral rule
might involve a comparison of some target strategy with some fixed strategy (see Weibull, 1995).
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loss.
3.4. Uniform mistake rule
When errors are uniform, every error occurs with the same probability. That is, from
state x, a strategy-revising agent who is currently playing l, will switch to l′ with a probability
given by
pηγ(l
′|l, x) :=

1
|arg maxl˜ piγ(l˜,x)|(1− ) +
1
n+1
 if l′ ∈ arg maxl˜ piγ(l˜, x)
1
n+1
 otherwise
where  = exp(−η−1). It follows that the resistance V (x, xγ,l,l′) of a transition from x to
xγ,l,l
′
equals
lim
η→0
−η lnP η(x, xγ,l,l′) =
{
0 if l′ ∈ arg maxl˜ piγ(l˜, x)
1 if l′ /∈ arg maxl˜ piγ(l˜, x)
3.5. Directed & Undirected errors
Let ∆γ(x) be the set of strategies for an agent of type γ = α, β which involve demanding
at least as much as the agent demands when best responding to the strategy distribution of
the other population.
∆γ(x) := {l : piγ(l, l) ≥ piγ(l′, l′) for some l′ ∈ arg max
l˜
piγ(l˜, x)}.
Undirected error processes retain the conditional probabilities pηγ(l
′|l, x) described above for
logit and uniform errors. Directed errors are when agents never demand less than their
best response, but can demand more. This fits with an interpretation of the perturbations
as idiosyncratic experimentation by agents to see if they can obtain a higher payoff. The
conditional probabilities of switching for directed processes are given by:
pˆηγ(l
′|l, x) :=
{
pηγ(l
′|l,x)∑
l˜∈∆γ (x) p
η
γ(l′|l,x) if l
′ ∈ ∆γ(x)
0 otherwise
where pηγ(l
′|l, x) denotes the conditional probability for the corresponding undirected process.
3.6. Conventions and stochastic stability
The process with η = 0, or  = 0, is the unperturbed process. The recurrent classes of
the unperturbed process are the absorbing states in which all α and β agents coordinate
on the same strategy, and each agent type receives nonzero payoff. We shall denote by
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Ei, i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, the state in which all α-agents play δi and all β-agents play f(δi),
xα(i) = N , xβ(i) = N . Hence, the absorbing states of the process are precisely those in the
set Λ := {E1, . . . , En−1}. Following Young (1993a), we refer to these states as conventions.
Let L := {1, . . . , n− 1} index the states in Λ = {Ei}i∈L.
Stochastic stability analysis selects from amongst conventions by taking a limit of the
stationary distributions of perturbed processes as η → 0. A preliminary step is to show that
such stationary distributions exist and are unique for any given positive value of η.
Lemma 2. Each process, uniform or logit, undirected or directed, for given η > 0, has a
unique stationary distribution, which we denote µη.
Proof. Note that for all x ∈ Ξ, nα ∈ ∆α(x), so for all of our processes, from any x ∈ Ξ, unless
xα(nα) = N , we have that P
η(x, xα,l,n) > 0 for some l 6= n. In this way, the process reaches
a state with xα(nα) = N , from which nβ is a best response for any β-agent. Therefore, from
any x ∈ Ξ, with positive probability En will be reached within 2N periods. As the state
space is finite, standard results in Markov chain theory4 imply that for all η > 0, P η has a
unique recurrent class and µη exists and is unique.
By standard arguments (see Young, 1998b), the limit µ := limη→0 µη exists, and for any
x ∈ Ξ, µ(x) > 0 implies that x is in a recurrent class of the process with η = 0. In our
setting, this implies x ∈ Λ.
Definition 2. A state x ∈ Ξ is stochastically stable if µ(x) > 0.
In a similar way that V (·, ·) measures the rarity of single steps in the dynamic, we will use
a concept, overall cost, that measures the rarity of a transition between any two states over
any number of periods. Let P(x, x′) be the set of finite sequences of states {x1, x2, . . . , xT}
such that x1 = x, xT = x′ and for some ηˆ > 0, P ηˆ(xτ , xτ+1) > 0, τ = 1, . . . , T − 1.
Definition 3. The overall cost of a transition between x, x′ ∈ Ξ is:
c(x, x′) := min
{x1,...,xT }∈P(x,x′)
T−1∑
τ=1
V (xτ , xτ+1).
If there is no positive probability path between x and x′ then let c(x, x′) = ∞. We
shall be interested in the cost of transitions between conventions. In the current setting,
this quantity is always finite. Denote the overall cost functions for the undirected-uniform,
undirected-logit, directed-uniform and directed-logit processes by cU , cL, cˆU , cˆL respectively.
4See, for example, “Probability” by Shiryaev (1995).
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4. Transition costs for exponential family: a boundary problem and a solution
For uniform error processes, any least cost transition from a given convention of the
contract game to some other convention is driven by errors within a single population. That
is, from some initial convention, errors occur in one of the populations, following which,
agents from the other population can best respond in a way which differs from the initial
convention. Errors in the population which best responds differently would be superfluous.
This logic does not translate to situations in which error costs are state dependent. It is
theoretically possible that on a path between conventions, errors in one population could
be required to facilitate errors in the other population. Some previous work (e.g. Belloc
and Bowles, 2013) appears to implicitly assume that least cost transitions under logit errors
involve only errors in a single population. This is not the case, as can be seen in the following
example, in which the least cost transition requires both populations to make errors. Define
the basin of attraction of a convention, the set of states from which the unperturbed dynamic
converges to that convention with probability 1.
Definition 4. The basin of attraction of Ei is given by
D(Ei) = {x ∈ Ξ : c(x,Ei) = 0, c(x,Ej) > 0 for all j 6= i}
For a given convention, Ei, we seek to determine the lowest cost transition path to some
state outside of the convention’s basin of attraction, D(Ei).
Example 1. Consider the logit dynamics. Suppose that we have the following game:
1β 2β
1α 5,4 0,0
2α 0,0 7,8
.
We suppose that N = 5. First we compute the minimum escaping cost from E1 such that
D(E2) is reached by transitions by only one population. We have⌈
N
piα(1)
piα(1) + piα(2)
⌉
piβ(1) = 12,
⌈
N
piβ(1)
piβ(1) + piβ(2)
⌉
piα(1) = 10.
Next, consider the following transitions:
β switching from 1β to 2β
⌈
N
piα(1)
piα(1) + piα(2)
⌉
− 1 times and
α switching from 1α to 2α
⌈
N
piβ(1)
piβ(1) + piβ(2)
⌉
times.
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Then this gives a path from E1 to E2 and the cost of the path is given by(⌈
N
piα(1)
piα(1) + piα(2)
⌉
− 1
)
piβ(1) +
⌈
N
piβ(1)
piβ(1) + piβ(2)
⌉
×
[
1
N
(
N −
(⌈
N
piα(1)
piα(1) + piα(2)
⌉
− 1
))
piα(1)− 1
N
(⌈
N
piα(1)
piα(1) + piα(2)
⌉
− 1
)
piα(2)
]
= 8.4
which is smaller than the minimum costs of transitions driven by a single population.
So we see that in Example 1, the least cost transition from E1 to E2 requires errors to
be made by agents in both populations. This is due to the behavior of the process close to
the boundary of the basin of attraction of E1. After β-agents make errors, the cost of errors
by α-agents is reduced. A single error by a β-agent has a lower cost than the consequent
reduction in the cost of two errors by α-agents. Two errors by β-agents reduce the cost
further still. However, after two errors have been made by β-agents, subsequent errors by
β-agents no longer have a linear effect on the cost of an error by an α-agent due to the
zero lower bound on V (·, ·). Following two errors by β-agents, the cost of a third error by a
β-agent is higher than the cost of two errors by α-agents. A moment’s consideration leads
one to see that, for any given population size, examples can be constructed for which least
cost transitions involve errors by both populations.
Fortunately, for exponential revision protocols, a class that includes the logit choice rule,
we shall show that when the population size is large, starting from a convention Ei, the least
cost transition path out of the basin of attraction of Ei has a cost approximately equal to
the least cost such transition from the restricted class of paths which only involve a single
population making errors. The class of exponential revision protocols is defined (Sandholm,
2010b) as the processes satisfying
log
(
pηγ(i|j, x)
pηγ(j|i, x)
)
= η−1 (pi(j, xγ−)− pi(i, xγ−)) .
where γ− := α for γ = β and γ− := β for γ = α. This is a flexible class of rules which includes
the Baker and Metropolis better reply dynamics, and the logit choice rule (see Appendix A).
Definition 5. Let −→c (., .) be a cost function restricted to minimize resistance over paths
satisfying (i) errors are only made by one of the populations, and (ii) only a single alternative
strategy is ever played in error. That is,
−→c (x, x′) := min
{x1,...,xT }∈−→P (x,x′)
T−1∑
τ=1
V (xτ , xτ+1).
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where
−→P (x, x′) is the set of paths from x to x′ such that for any {x1, . . . , xT} ∈ −→P (x, x′),
there exists some γ ∈ {α, β}, k, j, such that for any xt, xt+1 such that V (xt, xt+1) > 0, we
have that xt+1 = (xt)γ,k,j.
For the remainder of the paper, to aid conciseness we use the following notation.
Definition 6. When used to compare c(., .) or V(.) functions, the relations ≈ and . are
defined such that a ≈ b if and only if for any , for large enough N , a ∈ (b − , b + ).
Likewise, a . b if and only if for any , for large enough N , a ≤ b+ .
The main theorem of this section can now be stated. Under exponential revision proto-
cols, including the logit choice rule, lowest cost transitions between conventions of contract
games can be approximated by the lowest cost transitions which involve errors being made
by agents in only one of the populations, and those agents making only one type of error.
Theorem 1. Let Λ, indexed by L, be the set of strict Nash equilibria of a contract game.
Let |Λ| ≥ 2. Let i ∈ L be fixed. Let the strategy revision rule be an exponential revision
protocol. Then
1
N
min
j 6=i
c(Ei, Ej) ≈ 1
N
min
j 6=i
−→c (Ei, Ej) (4)
The proof (see Appendix B) relies on explicitly bounding transition costs from below.
This is achieved by showing that, from Ei, there is always a least cost transition path to
outside of D(Ei) that involves the first error on the path being repeated consecutively until
the state is close to the border of D(Ei). The cost of this path segment bounds the total cost
of the path from below. Moreover, as N gets large, the cost of the path segment approaches
the cost of the least cost path involving errors in only a single population.
Using Theorem 1, we obtain a simple estimation of the least cost transition path away
from any convention.
Corollary 1. Consider a contract game. Let the strategy revision rule be an exponential
revision protocol. Then
1
N
min
j 6=i
cN(Ei, Ej) ≈ 1
N
min
j 6=i
piα(i)
⌈
N
piβ(i)
piβ(i) + piβ(j)
⌉
∧ 1
N
min
j 6=i
piβ(i)
⌈
N
piα(i)
piα(i) + piα(j)
⌉
.
(5)
Results of this section in hand, we now return to our application.
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5. Application to contract games
In this section we characterize the stochastically stable conventions. The stochastically
stable convention for each process is associated with a bargaining solution. Transition costs
between conventions are estimated, following which, the stochastically stable conventions can
be characterized. Finally, the stochastically stable conventions are shown to approximate
bargaining solutions.
The following lemma gives the overall costs of transitions between conventions for undi-
rected processes. These transition costs do not depend on the destination convention, only
on the origin. This is because least cost transitions are caused by extreme actions by agents
in one of the populations and after enough such actions have occurred, the process can transit
to any convention for zero additional cost.
Lemma 3. For i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, i 6= j, N large,
1
N
cU(Ei, Ej) =
1
N
⌈
N
f(δi)
f(δi) + s¯β
⌉
∧ 1
N
⌈
N
δi
δi+ s¯α
⌉
, (6)
1
N
cL(Ei, Ej) ≈ 1
N
δi
⌈
N
f(δi)
f(δi) + s¯β
⌉
∧ 1
N
f(δi)
⌈
N
δi
δi+ s¯α
⌉
(7)
For cU(Ei, ·), the expression to the left of the ∧ and inside the d.e is the number of errors
that α-agents must make to induce a β-agent to best respond with an action other than
iβ. The equivalent expression to the right of the ∧ is the number of errors that β-agents
must make to induce an α-agent to best respond with an action other than iα. For c
L(Ei, ·),
these costs are adjusted by the cost of the individual errors. For example, if every β-agent
is playing iβ, the cost of an α-agent making a mistake and choosing an action other than iβ
is equal to δi, as the α-agent in question would obtain a payoff of 0, instead of δi which is
the payoff from best responding.
The next lemma gives overall costs of least cost transitions between states in Λ for directed
processes. For these processes, the destination convention does matter. Least cost transitions
are caused by agents from one of the populations demanding an incremental increase in their
payoffs. That is, the lowest cost transition from a convention Ei is to one of the adjacent
conventions Ei−1, Ei+1.
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Lemma 4. For i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, Z ∈ {U,L}, N large,
1
N
min
j 6=i
cˆZ(Ei, Ej) ≈ 1
N
cˆZ(Ei, Ei−1) ∧ 1
N
cˆZ(Ei, Ei+1),
1
N
min
j 6=i
cˆU(Ei, Ej) =
1
N
⌈
N
i
2i− 1
⌉
∧ 1
N
⌈
N
f(δi)
f(δ(i+ 1)) + f(δi)
⌉
, (8)
1
N
min
j 6=i
cˆL(Ei, Ej) ≈ 1
N
f(δi)
⌈
N
i
2i− 1
⌉
∧ 1
N
δi
⌈
N
f(δi)
f(δ(i+ 1)) + f(δi)
⌉
. (9)
Once again, the expressions inside the d.e on either side of the ∧ in (8) are the number
of errors required to induce a best response which differs from that of the initial convention.
Again, the logit expressions in (9) are adjusted for the cost of the individual errors. Note
that the expressions to the left hand side of the ∧ in (6), (8) and (9) are decreasing in i,
and the expressions to the right hand side of the ∧ are increasing in i. Furthermore, note
that for i = 1, the left hand side in (6), (8), (9) is larger than the right hand side, and the
converse is true for i = n− 1. Note that neither side of the expression in (7) is monotonic,
but both sides are concave in i.
An i-graph is a directed graph on L such that every vertex except for i has exactly one
exiting edge and the graph has no cycles. Let G(i) denote the set of i-graphs. Define:
V(i) := min
g∈G(i)
∑
(j→k)∈g
c(Ej, Ek),
We know from Freidlin and Wentzell (1984); Young (1993a) that:
µ(Ei) > 0⇔ i ∈ arg min
j∈L
V(j).
This result will be used in our characterization theorem of section 5.2. The observant reader
will, however, have noticed that four stochastic processes and only three bargaining solutions
have been defined in the paper so far. As a final step before the characterization, we define
another bargaining solution.
5.1. The Q4 bargaining solution
We now proceed to define a fourth bargaining solution, the Q4 bargaining solution. The
reason we believe this solution to be interesting and relevant will become clear with Theorem
2 of the next section.
Definition 7. The Q4 bargaining solution.
tQ4 := arg max
0≤t≤s¯α
t f(t)φ(t), where φ(t) :=
1
t+ s¯α
∧ 1
f(t) + s¯β
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That is, the Q4 bargaining solution maximizes an adjusted Nash product. We will see
that the solution is characterized by a three part piecewise function, with one part differing
considerably from the other two parts. The properties of the Q4 bargaining solution are
analyzed further and compared to existing bargaining solutions in section 6. First, the
characterization theorem of the paper is given.
5.2. Characterization theorem
The theorem presented in this section characterizes the selection results of the evolution-
ary processes discussed above. To reiterate, the processes are all perturbed best response
processes and differ only in their perturbation structure. The perturbations analyzed vary
along two dimensions: they can be undirected or directed, they can be uniform or logit.
First, a lemma is given which characterizes the stochastically stable states of the model for
given δ and given large population size. The stochastically stable states are conventions
which maximize the expressions (6), (7), (8), (9).
Lemma 5. For large N , c ∈ {cU , cL, cˆU , cˆL}, µ(Ei) > 0 implies that j = i maximizes the
approximation of mink∈L\{j} c(Ej, Ek) given in (6), (7), (8), (9). When this maximizer is
unique, µ(Ei) > 0 if and only if
i ∈ arg max
j∈L
min
k∈L\{j}
c(Ej, Ek). (10)
This characterizes the stochastically stable states for the problem. The principle theo-
rem of the paper now approximates these states for large N and small δ, linking them to
bargaining solutions. The theorem states that for a fine discretization (small δ) and large
populations (large N), the stochastically stable states of our four processes correspond to
our four bargaining solutions. The content of the theorem is summarized by table 1 given
in the introduction to the paper. The results of the first row of table 1 (uniform errors) are
known from Young (1998a) and Naidu et al. (2010). The results of the second row (logit
errors) are, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, new.
Theorem 2. For any ε > 0, there exists δ¯ such that for all δ < δ¯, there exists Nδ ∈ N such
that for all N ≥ Nδ, µ(Ei) > 0 =⇒ |δi− t∗| < ε, where
t∗ =

tKS if P η is uniform-undirected.
tQ4 if P η is logit-undirected.
tNB if P η is uniform-directed.
tE if P η is logit-directed.
Uniform and logit errors are by far the most common errors used in the stochastic stability
literature. Under uniform errors, the (order of the) probability of a given error is state
independent, so selection is determined by how easy it is to cause a change in the best
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response of one population when mutations occur in the other population. Directed errors
truncate the error distribution so that some errors are completely disallowed. This is one way
of varying the probabilities with which errors are made, and allowing the ease with which
errors are made to influence selection. A more gradual way is to use logit perturbations,
under which errors which are more costly (in terms of payoffs) to the erring agent occur with
lower probability. It is gratifying that the three classic bargaining solutions are selected under
three of the four combinations covered by the theorem. However, the solution in our fourth
quadrant, the Q4 solution, is quite a different object: the two drivers of selection, (i) ease of
making errors, and (ii) ease of responding to errors, combine to create non-monotonicities
that give the solution unusual properties. These shall be discussed in section 6.
6. Properties of the Q4 solution
In this section we examine the properties of the Q4 bargaining solution. First, we rewrite
tQ4 as
tQ4 = arg max
0≤t≤s¯α
h1(t) ∧ h3(t), (11)
where
h1(t) :=
tf(t)
t+ s¯α
, h3(t) :=
tf(t)
f(t) + s¯β
Not coincidentally, h1, h3 are the functions either side of the ∧ in expression 7. We denote
the maximizers of these functions by t1, t3 respectively.
tl := arg max
0≤t≤s¯α
hl(t), l = 1, 3.
When h1(t) and h3(t) intersect for 0 ≤ t ≤ s¯α, that is for 12 ≤ s¯αs¯β ≤ 2, we let t2 be the value
of t for which this intersection occurs. That is, t2 solves
t2 + s¯α = f(t2) + s¯β.
Remark 1. The Q4 bargaining solution solves
tQ4 :=

t1 if h1(t1) < h3(t1), (Case 1)
t3 if h3(t3) < h1(t3) , (Case 3)
t2 otherwise. (Case 2)
The cases of the solution are numbered by the order in which they occur as the ratio
s¯α/¯sβ moves from high to low values. For high values of s¯α/¯sβ, the maximum of h1(·) lies
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underneath the curve of h3(·). This is when Case 1 holds and is illustrated for a linear
bargaining frontier in figure 4. For low values of s¯α/¯sβ, the maximum of h3(·) lies underneath
the curve of h1(·) and we are in Case 3. For values of s¯α/¯sβ close to 1, the maximizer of (11)
is determined by the intersection of h1(·) and h3(·). The decomposition of Q4 in Remark 1
facilitates analysis, as Case 2 exhibits very different properties to Cases 1 and 3.
In table 2 we list the axioms satisfied by the four bargaining solutions in the paper.
Efficiency is achieved by every solution, and implies that if a solution gives t∗ to Player α,
it gives f(t∗) to Player β. Other axioms are as follows.
Definition 8. Let g, f be two bargaining frontiers, t∗g, t
∗
f their associated solutions.
IIA g ≥ f, g(t∗g) ≤ f(t∗g) =⇒ t∗g = t∗f .
Invariance g(x) = f(ax), a ∈ R =⇒ t∗g = 1at∗f .
Monotonicity g ≥ f =⇒ t∗g ≥ t∗f .
Individual Monotonicity g ≥ f, g(0) = f(0) =⇒ t∗g ≥ t∗f .
Stretch-monotonicity g(x) = f(ax), a ∈ R, a < 1 =⇒ t∗g ≥ t∗f .
We include a non-standard axiom: stretch-monotonicity. This holds when a stretch of the
bargaining frontier parallel to the axis measuring player γ’s payoffs will (weakly) increase the
payoff of player γ. Stretch-monotonicity is weaker than individual monotonicity, which is in
turn weaker than monotonicity. Furthermore, stretch-monotonicity is implied by invariance,
and is therefore satisfied by all of the existing major bargaining solutions. It can be seen in
table 2 that the Q4 bargaining solution is highly irregular in that it does not comply with
many of the axioms.
Axiom Nash K-S Egalitarian Q4
Symmetry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Efficiency Yes Yes Yes Yes
IIA Yes No Yes No
Invariance Yes Yes No No
Monotonicity No No Yes No
Individual Monotonicity No Yes Yes No
Stretch-monotonicity Yes Yes Yes No
Table 2: Axioms satisfied by bargaining solutions.
The presence of s¯α and s¯β in the Q4 solution means that IIA is violated. In Case 1 and
Case 3, the Q4 solution is similar to the Nash solution, but adjusted to take into account
the best possible outcome for one of the players. If s¯α > s¯β and the conditions for Case 1
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are satisfied, then Player α does worse than he does under the Nash solution. Moreover, an
increase in s¯α results in player α achieving a higher payoff: his payoff is increasing in his
best possible outcome. These facts can be seen by comparing the first order condition for
the Nash bargaining solution:
tNBf ′(tNB) + f(tNB) = 0
to the first order condition for the Q4 solution in Case 1:
tQ4f ′(tQ4) +
s¯α
tQ4 + s¯α
f(tQ4) = 0.
The increase of Player α’s payoff in his best possible outcome differs from the similar effect
in the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. The effect in the latter depends on the ratio of s¯α and
s¯β, whereas in Case 1 of the Q4 solution, changes in s¯β have no direct effect. Symmetrically,
in Case 3 the solution depends on f(.) and s¯β, but not directly on s¯α.
When s¯α and s¯β are relatively close to one another and the solution is in Case 2, player
γ’s payoff does not necessarily increase with s¯γ, and can even decrease. In fact, the solution
is an Egalitarian solution with a notional disagreement point of (s¯β, s¯α). The disagreement
point is wholly notional as it lies outside of the bargaining set. The players equalize their
losses from this notional disagreement point. Somewhat bizarrely, this notional disagreement
point for a player is equal to the maximum attainable payoff of the other player (see figure
2). This creates nonmonotonicities: it can be seen immediately from the expression for the
solution in Case 2, and the illustration in figure 2, that holding the bargaining frontier fixed
close to the current solution, an improvement in the best possible outcome for a player will
result in his achieving a lower payoff.
Proposition 1. Considering tQ4 as a function of s¯α, s¯β, and f(.) in the neighborhood of the
solution, we have that in Case 1, ∂t
Q4
∂s¯α
> 0, in Case 2, ∂t
Q4
∂s¯α
< 0, in Case 3, ∂t
Q4
∂s¯α
= 0.
Moreover, we can make a stronger statement about non-monotonicity. We shall shortly
see by means of an example that stretch-monotonicity is violated by the Q4 bargaining
solution. Consequently, the Q4 bargaining solution satisfies neither individual monotonicity
nor invariance.5
5It may be argued that invariance should be understood as a simple rescaling of payoffs, and that therefore
error probabilities should also be rescaled. The authors agree that should everything be rescaled, then
invariance will result. However, invariance as an axiom is more than just a statement about rescaling. It is
also a normative statement about how wealth affects bargaining power. It is this interpretation of invariance
that justifies an analysis of rescaled payoffs without a corresponding rescaling of error probabilities.
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Figure 2: Case 2 of the Q4 solution, also illustrating Egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions for
comparison.
6.1. Example: linear bargaining frontier
The case of a linear bargaining frontier is now analyzed. The frontier is given by the
equation f(t) = s¯β − t s¯βs¯α . Conditions under which each case of the solution pertains and
explicit solutions for each case are given in table 3. An increase in s¯α is equivalent to a
stretch of the bargaining frontier parallel to the horizontal axis. It can be seen that when
Case 2 pertains, an increase in s¯α results in a reduction in t
∗, even though the section of
the bargaining frontier where the solution lies does not remain constant under the stretch.
Figure 3 shows how, fixing s¯β, the payoff of Player α varies with s¯α. Plots of the least
Case Condition Solution
1 s¯α >
(
3
√
2
2
− 1
)
s¯β t
Q4 = (
√
2− 1)s¯α
2
(
3
√
2
2
− 1
)−1
s¯β ≤ s¯α ≤
(
3
√
2
2
− 1
)
s¯β t
Q4 =
(2s¯β−s¯α)s¯α
s¯α+s¯β
3 s¯α <
(
3
√
2
2
− 1
)−1
s¯β t
Q4 = (2−√2)s¯α
Table 3: Explicit expressions for the Q4 bargaining solution when the frontier is linear.
resistance exit from a convention (t, f(t)) driven by the mistakes of each agent type under
all four of our error specifications (that is, plots of the expressions in equations (6), (7), (8),
(9)) are given in figure 4 and 5 for t ranging from zero to s¯α. It can be observed that for
three of the specifications, the least resistances for transitions induced by the errors of any
given agent type are monotone functions of t. Thus, the solution lies at the intersection of
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Figure 3: tQ4 by s¯α, keeping s¯β = 1.
the two lines. For the undirected-logit specification the least resistances are non-monotonic.
Two effects compete: the ease with which errors are made, and the ease of responding to
errors. When either of these things are too easy, least resistances are low. The solution
will now not necessarily lie at the intersection of the two lines. When the ratio s¯α/¯sβ differs
significantly from 1, the maximum of one of the curves lies below the other curve. This is
Case 1 and Case 3 of our analysis, and Case 1 is illustrated in figure 4. When both maxima
of the curves lie above the other curve, then the solution is the intersection of the curves.
This is Case 2 of our analysis, and is illustrated in figure 5.
7. Discussion
This paper studies interactions by which standard axiomatic bargaining solutions emerge
from the non-cooperative play of minimally forward looking individuals. It develops a method
of determining minimum transition costs under processes for which mutation probabilities
are log-linearly state dependent. Since Theorem 1 holds trivially for uniform mistake models,
this result can be regarded as a useful generalization of the existing method of computing
minimum transition costs. This method is used to study perturbed adaptive play of contract
games – coordination games over points in a discretized bargaining set. The analysis high-
lights the interaction of two forces that drive evolutionary selection, namely (i) the ease of
making errors, and (ii) the ease of responding to errors. Three major bargaining solutions are
justified by plausible behavioral rules. The logit choice rule and other exponential strategy
revision protocols give rise to a new bargaining solution with interesting features: the Q4
solution.
An important feature of the Q4 solution is that it arises from any exponential revision
protocol. The logit choice rule requires that an agent compare his expected payoffs from all
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Figure 4: Least resistances by t for a linear frontier, s¯α = 1.5, s¯β = 1.
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Figure 5: Least resistances by t for a linear frontier, s¯α = s¯β = 1.
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possible strategies. Thus, the informational requirements of the logit choice rule are great
when there are numerous alternatives from which to choose. However, the class of exponential
revision protocols includes some rules with very limited informational requirements, such as
better reply rules, by which, in any given period, an agent only compares the expected payoff
from his current strategy to that of a single alternative strategy (see Sandholm, 2010a).
That the Q4 solution emerges from every member of this popular class of dynamics is a
result which contrasts with popular misconceptions of the “anything can happen” result of
Bergin and Lipman (1996). Log-linear error probabilities with full support suffice to select
Q4, irrespective of the finer details of the dynamic.
It can be asked whether intuitively appealing axioms can be found which uniquely char-
acterize the Q4 solution. Such an attempt would be complicated by the piecewise nature of
the Q4 solution. When players’ best possible outcomes differ considerably, the Q4 solution
is an adjusted Nash bargaining solution. When best possible outcomes are similar, the Q4
solution is similar to the Egalitarian solution, equalizing the losses of each player from a
notional payoff equal to the best possible outcome of the opposing player. Therefore, any
axiomatic characterization is likely to be similarly hybrid.
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Appendix A. Examples of revision rules
Here we present some revision rules under which Theorem 1 holds (see Appendix B).
Better Reply (Baker) Dynamic pηγ(l
′|l, x) ∝ exp(η−1piγ(l′,x))
exp(η−1piγ(l′,x))+exp(η−1piγ(l,x))
Better Reply (Metropolis) Dynamic pηγ(l
′|l, x) ∝ exp(η−1piγ(l′,x))
exp(η−1piγ(l′,x))∨exp(η−1piγ(l,x))
Incomplete Logit pηγ(l
′|l, x) = exp(η−1piγ(l′,x))∑
l˜∈C exp(η−1piγ(l˜,x))
where {l, l′} ⊆ C ⊂ S
Fixed comparison pηγ(l
′|l, x) ∝ exp(η−1piγ(l′,x))
exp(η−1piγ(l′,x))+exp(η−1M) for some M > 0
Then using lemma 1, we can find the following V functions for the Baker and Metropolis,
logit, and fixed comparison dynamics respectively. Baker, Metropolis and logit with full
support are examples of exponential revision protocols (Sandholm, 2010b).
V (x, xγ,i,j) = piγ(i, x) ∨ piγ(j, x)− piγ(j, x) = [piγ(i, x)− piγ(j, x)]+
V (x, xγ,i,j) = max
l˜∈C
piγ(l˜, x)− piγ(j, x)
V (x, xγ,i,j) = [M − piγ(j, x)]+ .
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1
This section gives sufficient conditions for Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 to hold. These condi-
tions are satisfied by exponential revision protocols. To express transitions by agents from
one strategy to another more succinctly, we write
eαi := ((0, · · · , N, · · · , 0), (0, · · · , 0, · · · , 0)), N in ith position
eβj := ((0, · · · , 0, · · · , 0), (0, · · · , N, · · · , 0)), N in jth position.
Throughout this section we consider transitions from Ei to some other convention for fixed
i. We define
Ξγ :=
{
xγ ∈ Rn :
∑
i
xγ(i) = N
}
and it is easy to see that Ξ = Ξα × Ξβ.
We consider V functions which satisfy the following properties:
C1: Irrelevance of own population
V (x, xγ,k,l) = V (y, yγ,k,l) for xγ = yγ, γ = α, β.
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C2: Affine Linearity
For all i, j, γ, there exists affine linear functions vγ,i,j : Ξγ− → R and constants λi,jγ > 0
and sets Ciγ ⊆ {0, . . . , n} such that
V (x, xγ,i,j) =

0 if x ∈ {y ∈ Ξ : yγ−(i) ≤ N − λi,jγ , yγ−(i) + yγ−(j) = Nγ−}
vγ,i,j(xγ−) if x ∈ {y ∈ Ξ : yγ−(i) > N − λi,jγ } and j ∈ Ciγ
∞ if x ∈ {y ∈ Ξ : yγ−(i) > N − λi,jγ } and j /∈ Ciγ
.
C3: Coordination
For all i, j, k, γ,
vγ,i,j(eγ−i ) = v
γ,i,k(eγ−i ),
where vγ,i,j is increasing w.r.t. xγ−(i) and decreasing w.r.t. xγ−(j), and vγ,i,j(e
γ−
j ) <
0 < vγ,i,j(eγ−i ).
Condition 1 merely requires that play occurs between two populations, for which payoffs
of each population depend on the strategy profile of the opponent population. Condition
2 requires that costs of transition vary linearly within the basin of attraction of each Nash
equilibrium (described by λi,jγ ) and thus coincide with some affine function v
γ,i,j. Condition
3 is satisfied when the underlying game is a contract game. Property C2 implies that we
can define
λ¯i,jα = θ¯ij := max
{
θ ∈ N: vβ,i,j
((
1− θ
N
)
eαi +
θ
N
eαj
)
> 0
}
(B.1)
λ¯i,jβ = ζ¯ij := max
{
ζ ∈ N: vα,i,j
((
1− η
N
)
eβi +
η
N
eβj
)
> 0
}
.
Rules that satisfy C1-C2, and satisfy C3 when payoffs are determined by an underlying
coordnation game include the logit choice rule, the Baker dynamic, the Metropolis dynamic,
generalized logit, and logit with limited domain of choice (See Appendix A).
Using the affine linearity of v, we have
vβ,i,j
((
1− θ
N
)
eαi +
θ
N
eαj
)
> 0 =⇒
(
1− θ
N
)
vβ,i,j(eαi ) +
θ
N
vβ,i,j(eαj ) > 0.
Observe that C2 implies that vβ,i,j(eαi ) > 0 and v
β,i,j(eαj ) < 0. It follows that
θ¯ij :=
⌈
N
vβ,i,j(eαi )
vβ,i,j(eαi )− vβ,i,j(eαj )
⌉
− 1, and ζ¯ij :=
⌈
N
vα,i,j(eβi )
vα,i,j(eβi )− vα,i,j(eβj )
⌉
− 1.
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When V is given by the logit (or Baker) dynamic, we have
vβ,i,j(eαi ) = piβ(i), v
β,i,j(eαj ) = −piβ(j).
Theorem 3. Suppose that V satisfies C1-C3. Let i be given. Then
1
N
min
j
cN(Ei, Ej) ≈ 1
N
min
j∈Ciα
vα,i,j(eβi )θ¯ij ∧
1
N
min
j∈Ciβ
vβ,i,j(eαi )ζ¯ij.
Using Theorem 3, Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 can be proven.
Proof of Theorem 1. It follows from (B.1) and C2 that 1/N θ¯ij ≈ 1/N (θ¯ij + 1) and that for
j ∈ Ciα, vα,i,j(eβi )(θ¯ij + 1) is the cost of a path of transitions from Ei to Ξ \D(Ei) in which
the only errors involve α players switching to j. As this is true for any j ∈ Ciα, and a similar
statement applies for vβ,i,j(eαi )(ζ¯ij + 1), the proof is complete.
Proof of Corollary 1. Observe that
vα,i,j(xβ) =
xβ(i)
N
piα(i)− xβ(j)
N
piα(j) and v
β,i,j(xα) =
xα(i)
N
piβ(i)− xα(j)
N
piβ(j)
λi,jα := θ¯ij =
⌈
N
piβ(i)
piβ(i) + piβ(j)
⌉
− 1 and λi,jβ := ζ¯ij =
⌈
N
piα(i)
piα(i) + piα(j)
⌉
− 1
satisfies C2.
The idea of the proof of Theorem 3 is as follows. To estimate the minimum bound for
the lowest cost transitions, we study the minimization problem of the cost function over all
possible paths escaping Ei. Estimation of such minima is complicated when the cost function
of a given path loses linearity at the boundary of the basin of attraction, as is illustrated
by Example 1. To overcome this problem, we explicitly estimate the size of the basin of
attraction (Lemma 6) and construct a “truncated” path which has the same or lower cost
than the original path, retaining linearity (Lemma 7).
For a path Γ = (x1, x2, · · · , xL), we write V (Γ) :=
∑L−1
l=1 V (xl, xl+1). We let
D¯(Ej) := {x ∈ Ξ : there exists a path Γ from x to Ej such that V (Γ) = 0}
θi := min
{
θ¯ij : j ∈ S
}
, ζ
i
:= min
{
ζ¯ij : j ∈ S
}
.
We shall use the notation (α, k, l : θ) to denote a number θ of α-agents switching, in suc-
cession, from action k to action l. Similarly, let (β, k′, l′ : ζ) denote a number ζ of β-agents
switching from action k to action l. Suppose that a path escaping Ei, Γ = (x1, x2, · · · , xL),
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consists of the following transitions
(α, k1, l1 : θ1)→ (α, k2, l2 : θ2)→ (β, k′1, l′1 : ζ1)→ (α, k3, l3 : θ3)→
· · · → (β, k′L′ , l′L′ : ζL′)→ (α, kL, lL : ζL),
such that x1 = Ei, x1, · · · , xL−1 ∈ D¯(Ej)c and xL ∈ D¯(Ej).
Lemma 6. Suppose that V satisfies C1-C3. Let {vγ,i,k}k be given by C2. Then the follow-
ing statements hold.
(1) Let y be a state in Γ immediate after the transition (α, km˜, lm˜; θm˜). If v
β,i,k(yα) ≤ 0 for
some k, then
∑
{m:km=i and m≤m˜} θm ≥ θi
(2) Let y be a state in Γ immediate after the transition (β, k′q˜, l
′
q˜; ζq˜). If v
α,i,k(yβ) ≤ 0 for
some k, then
∑
{q:k′q=i and q≤q˜} ζq ≥ ζ i
(3)
∑
{m:km=i} θm ≥ θi or
∑
{q:k′q=i} ζq ≥ ζ i
Proof. We first show that (1) holds. First we establish that if yα(i) > N − θi, then
vβ,i,k(yα) > 0 for all k. Let y ∈ Ξ such that yα(i) > N − θi. If y = (eαi , yβ), then from C2,
vβ,i,k(yα) > 0 for all k and we are done. Thus suppose that yα(i) 6= N. We define
cj :=
yα(j)
N − yα(i) .
for j = 1, 2, · · · , i− 1, i+ 1, · · · , n. Then∑
j 6=i
cj = 1 and
yα = c1(N − yα(i), 0, · · · , 0, yα(i), 0, · · · , 0) + c2(0, N − yα(i), · · · , 0, yα(i), 0, · · · , 0)
+ cn(0, · · · , 0, yα(i), 0, · · · , N − yα(i))
=
∑
j 6=i
cj(
yα(i)
N
eαi +
N − yα(i)
N
eαj ).
By C2 and C3,
vβ,i,k(yα) = v
β,i,k(
∑
j 6=i
cj(
yα(i)
N
eαi +
N − yα(i)
N
eαj )) =
∑
j 6=i
cjv
β,i,k(
yα(i)
N
eαi +
N − yα(i)
N
eαj )
> vβ,i,k(
yα(i)
N
eαi +
N − yα(i)
N
eαk ) > 0
where the first inequality follows from the fact that vβ,i,k(x) is decreasing in xα(k). This
shows that if yα(i) > N − θi, vβ,i,k(yα) > 0 for all k. Thus if vβ,i,k(yα) ≤ 0 for some k,
yα(i) ≤ N − θi. Let y be the state in Γ immediately after (α, km˜, lm˜; θm˜). If θm’s are the
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number of transitions by α-agents prior to y, then
yα(i) = N −
∑
{m:km=i,
m≤m˜}
θm +
∑
{m:lm=i,
m≤m˜}
θm
So ∑
{m:km=i,
m≤m˜}
θm = N − yα(i) +
∑
{m:lm=i,
m≤m˜}
θm ≥ N − yα(i) ≥ N − (N − θi) = θi.
Thus if vβ,i,k(yα) ≤ 0 for some k,
∑
{m:km=i,
m≤m˜}
θm ≥ θi.Then (2) follows similarly. (3) follows
from the fact that if y = xL ∈ D¯(Ej), then V (y, yα,i,k) = 0 for some k or V (y, yβ,i,k′) = 0 for
some k′. Thus from (1) and (2), (3) follows.
Consider again a path Γ from Ei to D¯(Ej). We seek a lower bound for V (Γ). To do
this we ignore terms V (x, xα,k,l)θ for k 6= i (or V (x, xβ,k′,l′)ζ for k′ 6= i) which represent
transitions from k 6= i to l. Then we bound the remaining terms from below. If x is the
state in Γ immediately after (α, km˜, lm˜; θm˜), then by C3
V (x, xβ,i,l) = vβ,i,l(xα) ≥ vβ,i,l(ym˜α ), where ym˜α (i) = N−
∑
{m:km=i, m≤m˜}
θm, y
m˜
α (l) =
∑
{m:km=i, m≤m˜}
θm.
Let
rm(η1, · · · , ηqm) := vα,i,lm(yqmβ ), uq(δ1, · · · , δmq) := vβ,i,l
′
q(ymqα ).
Then, omitting any terms related to transitions other than those from i, V (Γ) is bounded
below by
ϕ(θ, ζ) := r1θ1+u1(θ1)ζ1+· · ·+rmq˜(ζ1, · · · , ζq˜−1)θmq˜+uq˜(θ1, · · · , θmq˜)ζq˜+· · ·+rL(ζ1, · · · , ζL′)θL.
(B.2)
We will consider the following minimization problem:
min{ϕ(θ, ζ) : 0 ≤ θm ≤ θ¯km,lm , 0 ≤ ζq ≤ ζ¯k′q ,l′q for all m = 1, · · ·L, q = 1, · · · , L′, (B.3)
rm ≥ 0 for all m and uq ≥ 0 for all q,
L∑
m=1
θm ≥ θi}.
Similar problems can be defined for φ functions whose last term has a uL′(.) rather than a
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Figure B.6: Illustration of the truncation lemma.
rL(.).
Lemma 7 (Truncation). Consider the minimization problem given by (B.2) and (B.3).
Let (θ∗, ζ∗) be the optimal choices. If uq˜(θ∗) = 0 in (B.2), for
φ(θ, ζ) := r1θ1 + u1(θ1)ζ1 + · · ·+ rmq˜(ζ1, · · · , ζq˜−1)θmq˜ ,
we have
ϕ(θ∗, ζ∗) ≥ min{φ(θ, ζ) : 0 ≤ θm ≤ θ¯km,lm , 0 ≤ ζq ≤ ζ¯k′q ,l′q , rm ≥ 0, uq ≥ 0
for all 1 ≤ m ≤ mq˜, 1 ≤ q ≤ q˜ − 1,
∑
{m:m≤mq˜}
θm ≥ θi}.
A similar result holds if rm˜(ζ
∗) = 0 in (B.2).
Proof. From Lemma 6, if uq˜(θ
∗) = 0,
∑
{m:m≤mq˜} θ
∗
i ≥ θi. Thus for r = 1, 2, 3, 4 we have
ϕr(θ
∗, ζ∗) ≥ r1θ∗1 + u1(θ∗1)ζ∗1 + · · ·+ rmq˜(ζ∗1 , · · · , ζ∗q˜−1)θ∗mq˜
≥ min{φ(θ, ζ) : 0 ≤ θm ≤ θ¯km,lm , 0 ≤ ζq ≤ ζ¯k′q ,l′q , rm ≥ 0, uq ≥ 0
for all 1 ≤ m ≤ mq˜, 1 ≤ q ≤ q˜ − 1,
∑
{m:m≤mq˜}
θm ≥ θi}.
Proof of Theorem 3. We let
c¯N := min
j∈Ciα
vα,i,j(eβi )(θ¯ij + 1) ∧ min
j∈Ciβ
vβ,i,j(eαi )(ζ¯ij + 1)
cN := min
j∈Ciα
vα,i,j(eβi )θ¯ij ∧ min
j∈Ciβ
vβ,i,j(eαi )ζ¯ij
We will show that c¯N ≥ minj cN(Ei, Ej) ≥ cN . We suppose that Γ is a path from Ei to
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D(Ej) and that the final step in the path is a transition by an α-agent (the other case
follows similarly). Consider a ϕ function based on Γ and the minimization problem given
by B.3 before Lemma 7. Let (θ∗, ζ∗) be the optimal choices. If rm(ζ∗) = 0 for some m, or
uq(θ
∗) = 0 for some q, we can apply Lemma 7 and start over. Hence we suppose that at
(θ∗, ζ∗), rm(θ∗, ζ∗) > 0, uq(θ∗, ζ∗) > 0 for all m,q. First, suppose that
∑
m θ
∗
m > θi. Recall
that θm is associated with switches from i to lm, and ζm is associated with switches from i
to l′m. Because of affine linearity, we must have that (1) θ
∗
m = 0 or θ¯ilm , (2) ζ
∗
q = 0 or ζ¯il′q for
all m, q, and (3) at least one θ∗m˜ = θ¯ilm˜ .
if θ∗1 = θ¯il1 , ϕ˜(θ
∗, ζ∗) ≥ vα,i,l1(eβi )θ¯il1 > vα,i,l1(eβi )θi
if θ∗1 = 0, ζ
∗
1 = ζ¯il′1 , ϕ˜(θ
∗, ζ∗) ≥ vβ,i,l′1(eαi )ζ¯il′1 > vα,i,l
′
1(eαi )ζ i
if θ∗1 = 0, ζ
∗
1 = 0, ζ
∗
2 = ζ¯il′2 ϕ˜(θ
∗, ζ∗) ≥ vβ,i,l′2(eαi )ζ¯il′2 > vα,i,l
′
2(eαi )ζ i
...
...
if θ∗1 = 0, θ
∗
2 = 0, · · · , θ∗m˜ = θ¯ilm˜
ζ∗1 = 0, ζ
∗
2 = 0, · · · , ζ∗qm˜ = 0 ϕ˜(θ∗, ζ∗) ≥ vα,i,lm˜(eβi )θ¯ilm˜ > vα,i,lm˜(eβi )θi
(B.4)
Thus we obtain the desired lower bound cN . Next, suppose that
∑
m θ
∗
m = θi. Further divide
into two cases: (i) θ∗m < θi for all m and (ii) θ
∗
m˜ = θi for some m˜. Consider case (i). In
this case there are θ∗m˜ and θ
∗
m˜′ such that 0 < θ
∗
m˜, θ
∗
m˜′ < θi. Since
∑
m θm = θi is linear with
respect to θm’s, the affine linearity of ϕ w.r.t. θm implies that either (θ
∗
m˜ + o, θ
∗
m˜′ − o) or
(θ∗m˜ − o, θ∗m˜′ + o) for small o gives lower or equal ϕ than θ∗. A lower ϕ value contradicts
optimality of θ∗m. If the new value is equal, repeat the argument until some θ
∗
m = θi for some
m. Now consider case (ii). If θ∗m˜ = θi, then evaluating as in (B.4), we obtain the desired
lower bound.
Concerning the upper bound, let j∗α and j
∗
β be the states to which the direct escaping
costs are minimal, that is j∗α solves minj v
α,i,j(eβi )θ¯ij, and j
∗
β solves minj v
β,i,j(eαi )ζ¯ij. The
upper bound follows by either choosing a path consisting solely of θ¯ij∗α + 1 transitions by
α-agents from i to j∗α, or a path comprising ζ¯ij∗β + 1 transitions by β-agents from i to j
∗
β.
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Appendix C. Proofs of other Lemmas and Theorems
Proof of Lemma 3. If, for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}, a sequence {x0, . . . , xT}, x0 = Ei, xT = Ej,
is such that
∑T−1
τ=0 V (x
τ , xτ+1) = c(Ei, Ej). For γ = α, β, define
τγ = min{τ : V (xτ , xτ+1) = 0, xτ+1 = (xτ )γ,j,k, k 6= i} ∧ T.
It must be that
(N − xτβα (i))s¯β ≥ xτβα (i) f(δi),
where the left hand side is an upper bound on piβ(jβ, x
τβ
α ), j 6= i, and the right hand side
equals piβ(iβ, x
τβ
α ). Rearranging, we obtain
N − xτβα (i) ≥
⌈
N
f(δi)
f(δi) + s¯β
⌉
=: ξα.
Similarly,
N − xταβ (i) ≥
⌈
N
δi
δi+ s¯α
⌉
=: ξβ.
If τβ < τα, then at least ξα α-agents need to have made errors before time τβ. Similarly, if
τα < τβ, then at least ξβ β-agents need to have made errors before time τα.
Uniform-undirected
For τ = 0, . . . , ξα, let x
τ+1
α (0) = x
τ
α(0) + 1, noting that V (x
τ , xτ+1) = 1. For τ = ξα +
1, . . . , ξα + N , let x
τ+1
β (0) = x
τ
β(0) + 1, noting that V (x
τ , xτ+1) = 0. For τ = ξα + N +
1, . . . , N + N , let xτ+1α (0) = x
τ
α(0) + 1, noting that V (x
τ , xτ+1) = 0. Note that x2N = E0.
We have shown that c(Ei, E0) ≤ ξα. For τ = N + N + 1, . . . , 3N , let xτ+1α (j) = xτα(0) + 1,
noting that V (xτ , xτ+1) = 0. For τ = 3N + 1, . . . , 2N + 2N , let xτ+1α (j) = x
τ
α(j) + 1,
noting that V (xτ , xτ+1) = 0. We have shown that c(E0, Ej) = 0. Therefore c(Ei, Ej) ≤
c(Ei, E0) + c(E0, Ej) ≤ ξα. A similar construction shows that c(Ei, Ej) ≤ ξβ. As at least ξα
or ξβ errors are required before τ = min{τα, τβ}, it must be that c(Ei, Ej) ≥ min{ξα, ξβ}.
The above construction shows that this is also an upper bound on c(Ei, Ej).
Logit-undirected
Applying Corollary 1 and noting that minima are obtained at jα = 0 and jβ = n we have∣∣∣∣ 1N minj cN(Ei, Ej)− 1N δi
⌈
N
f(δi)
f(δi) + s¯β
⌉
∧ 1
N
f(δi)
⌈
N
δi
δi+ s¯α
⌉∣∣∣∣ < .
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Now note that this approximation can be exactly attained for transitions to either E0 or
En. For example, if α-agents make ξα errors to play 0α, then each of these transitions has a
cost of δi, and the transitions suffice to reach E0 in the same manner as in the proof of the
uniform-undirected case. From E0, any Ej can be reached at zero cost, so we can state the
stronger result that for all j 6= i∣∣∣∣ 1N cN(Ei, Ej)− 1N δi
⌈
N
f(δi)
f(δi) + s¯β
⌉
∧ 1
N
f(δi)
⌈
N
δi
δi+ s¯α
⌉∣∣∣∣ < .
Proof of Lemma 4. If, for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}, a sequence {x0, . . . , xT}, x0 = Ei, xT = Ej,
is such that
∑T−1
τ=0 V (x
τ , xτ+1) = c(Ei, Ej). and letting τα, τβ, be defined as in the proof of
Lemma 3, it must be that, when τβ < τα,
(N − xτβα (i))f(δ(i+ 1)) ≥ xτβα (i) f(δi),
where the left hand side is an upper bound on piβ(jβ, x
τβ
α ), j 6= i, as ∆α(xτ ) = {i+ 1, . . . , n}
for τ < τα. The right hand side equals piβ(iβ, x
τβ
α ). Rearranging, we obtain
N − xτβα (i) ≥
⌈
N
f(δi)
f(δ(i+ 1)) + f(δi)
⌉
=: ξˆα.
Similarly, when τα < τβ,
N − xταβ (i) ≥
⌈
N
i
2i− 1
⌉
=: ξˆβ.
Uniform-directed
For τ = 0, . . . , ξα, let x
τ+1
α (i + 1) = x
τ
α(i + 1) + 1, noting that V (x
τ , xτ+1) = 1. For
τ = ξα + 1, . . . , ξα + N , let x
τ+1
β (i + 1) = x
τ
β(i + 1) + 1, noting that V (x
τ , xτ+1) = 0. For
τ = ξα + N + 1, . . . , 2N , let x
τ+1
α (i + 1) = x
τ
α(i + 1) + 1, noting that V (x
τ , xτ+1) = 0. Note
that xN+N = Ei+1. We have shown that c(Ei, Ei+1) ≤ ξα. A similar construction shows that
c(Ei, Ei−1) ≤ ξβ. As at least ξα or ξβ errors are required before τ = min{τα, τβ}, it must be
that c(Ei, Ej) ≥ min{ξα, ξβ}. The above construction shows that this bound is attained for
some j ∈ {i− 1, i+ 1}.
Logit-directed
Applying Corollary 1 and noting that minima are obtained at jα = i+ 1 and jβ = i− 1 we
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have ∣∣∣∣ 1N minj cN(Ei, Ej)− 1N f(δi)
⌈
N
i
2i− 1
⌉
∧ 1
N
δi
⌈
N
f(δi)
f(δ(i+ 1)) + f(δi)
⌉∣∣∣∣ < .
Now note that this approximation can be exactly attained for transitions to either Ei−1 or
Ei+1. For example, if α-agents make ξα errors to play (i+ 1)α, then each of these transitions
has a cost of δi, and the transitions suffice to reach Ei+1 in the same manner as in the proof
of the uniform-undirected case.
Proof of lemma 5. Let i maximize the relevant one of (6), (7), (8), (9). For c = cU , cL,
let g = {j → i : j ∈ L, j 6= i}. For c = cˆU , cˆL, let g = {j → j + 1 : j ∈ L, j < i} ∪ {j →
j − 1 : j ∈ L, j > i}. Note that k → l ∈ g implies that minj∈L c(Ek, Ej) ≈ c(Ek, El). Also
note that by our choice of i, for all k 6= i, minj∈L c(Ek, Ej) . minj∈L c(Ei, Ej). This implies
that V(i) . V(j) for all j ∈ L if and only if i is a maximizer of the relevant expression. So
V(i) ≤ V(j) for all j ∈ L implies that i is a maximizer.
Proof of Theorem 2. To prove the Theorem we use the following two lemmas.
Lemma 8. Suppose that ϕ is a real valued function and S is a finite set. Then there exists
Nˆ such that for all N > Nˆ
arg max
t∈S
1
N
dNϕ(t)e = arg max
t∈S
ϕ(t).
The proof of the above lemma readily follows from the pointwise convergence of 1/N dNϕ(t)e
to ϕ(t).
Lemma 9. Suppose ϕ is a continuous function which admits a unique maximum. Sup-
pose ϕδ such that ϕδ converges uniformly to ϕ as δ → 0 and t∗ ∈ arg maxϕ(t) and
i∗ ∈ arg maxi ϕδ(iδ). Then for all  > 0, there exists δ¯ > 0 such that for all δ < δ¯, we
have |i∗δ − t∗| < .
Proof. By the definitions of t∗ ∈ arg maxt ϕ(t) and i∗ ∈ arg maxi ϕδ(iδ), we have ϕ(t∗) ≥
ϕ(i∗δ) and ϕδ(i∗δ) ≥ ϕδ(t). Let  > 0. By uniform convergence we can choose δ < δ¯, such
that |ϕδ(t∗)− ϕ(t∗)| <  and |ϕδ(i∗δ)− ϕ(i∗δ)| < . For δ < δ¯, we have ϕ(i∗δ) ≤ ϕ(t∗) ≤
ϕδ(t
∗) +  ≤ ϕδ(i∗δ) +  < ϕ(i∗δ) + 2. Thus we have that
For all ˜ > 0, there exists δ¯ such that for all δ < δ¯,we have |ϕ(t∗)− ϕ(i∗δ)| < ˜. (C.1)
Without loss of generality we suppose that i∗δ < t∗ and let  > 0 be given. Then for  > 0
we can choose ρ¯ such that for all ρ < ρ¯
ϕ(t∗)− ρ < y < ϕ(t∗) implies |ϕ−1(y)− t∗| < , (C.2)
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where ϕ−1 is the inverse function for ϕ defined in a neighborhood of t∗ except t∗. Now let
 > 0. Choose ρ¯ satisfying (C.2) first. Then for ˜ = ρ < ρ¯, choose δ¯ satisfying (C.1). Then
for ρ and for δ < δ¯, we have |ϕ(i∗δ)− ϕ(t∗)| < ρ. Also since ρ < ρ¯, by (C.2) we have |i∗δ−t∗|
< . Thus we show that for all  > 0, there exists δ¯ > 0 such that for all δ < δ¯, we have
|i∗δ − t∗| < .
Note that for large enough N the values taken by the expressions of the form dae ∧ dbe
in (6), (7), (8), (9) equal da ∧ be. Lemma 8 then implies that for large N we can ignore
the ceiling function in (6), (7), (8), (9) when determining the stochastically stable states.
Replacing δi by t in expressions (6), (7) and taking the limit as δ → 0 gives
f(t)
f(t) + s¯β
∧ t
t+ s¯α
(C.3)
t
f(t)
f(t) + s¯β
∧ f(t) t
t+ s¯α
(C.4)
respectively. Using Lemma 9, and noting that these functions are maximized at tKS, tQ4,
respectively, we have the results for the cases of uniform-undirected and logit-undirected
pertubations. For the case of logit-directed perturbations, the expression in (9) takes the
form a(t) ∧ b(t) after the ceiling function has been removed. Continuity of f(·) implies that
there exist ε > 0, δˆ > 0 such that for all δ < δˆ, a(t) > b(t) for all t < ε, and a(t) < b(t) for
all t > s¯α − ε. Therefore, the following function equals (9) at all t = δi, i = 1, . . . , n− 1.
ϕδ(t) =

b(t) if t < ε.
a(t) ∧ b(t) if ε ≤ t ≤ s¯α − ε.
a(t) if t > s¯α − ε.
Note that ϕδ converges uniformly to ϕ as δ → 0, where
ϕ(t) =
f(t)
2
∧ t
2
.
This expression is maximized at tE so by Lemma 9 we have the result for logit-directed
perturbations.
For the case of uniform-directed pertubations, we cannot apply Lemma 9, since the
function in the cost expression does not converge to a function with a unique maximum. To
address this case, we observe that Lemma 8 implies that for large N
i∗ ∈ arg max
i
δi
2δi− δ ∧
f(δi)
f(δ(i+ 1)) + f(δi)
.
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Writing t = δi and noting that the LHS of the ∧ is decreasing in t, and the RHS is increasing
in t, it can be seen that δi∗ can be approximated by t˜ given by
t˜
2t˜− δ =
f(t˜)
f(t˜+ δ) + f(t˜)
⇔ t˜ f(t˜+ δ)− f(t˜)
δ
+ f(t˜) = 0
which approaches the first order condition for tNB as δ → 0. Hence δi∗ → tNB (See detailed
argument in Naidu et al., 2010).
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